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— Book Review —
Harold Bruff,
Untrodden Ground:
America’s Evolutionary
Presidency
Martin S. Flaherty†
Harold Bruff’s Untrodden Ground: America’s Evolutionary
Presidency is by any measure a significant contribution to the debate
over what may be the critical question facing American constitutionalism today. As witness recent books by Bruce Ackerman,1 Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule,2 Jack Goldsmith,3 and the relentless John
Yoo,4 executive power, for better or worse, today threatens to
overwhelm traditional conceptions of the separation of powers.5 Professor Bruff’s work, among other things, seeks to show how the nation
got to this point and, in so doing, fills a wide gap left open by most
legal scholarship. It seeks to achieve this goal with a series of case
studies showing the ways various presidents have expanded and shaped
executive authority in ways that the Founders would scarcely recognize.
Professor Bruff, a rigorous, respected, yet oddly underappreciated
expert on executive authority, is ideal for the task. This combination
of topic and author should find the literate “lay” audience he seeks,
which can only be a good thing given the current level of political
discourse. At the same time, the volume should make no less of a
contribution to scholarly discourse as well.
Untrodden Ground advances a careful central thesis, which has
several sensible corollaries. Its main task is to demonstrate how the
†

Leitner Family Professor of International Human Rights Law, Fordham
Law School; Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University. My thanks to Chris Pioch for
nimble research assistance.

1.

Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (2013).
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Eric A Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound:
After the Madisonian Republic (2011).
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Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency after 9/11 (2012).

4.

John Yoo, Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power
from George Washington to George W. Bush (2009).

5.

See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725
(1996).
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development of the modern executive has been a story on ongoing
custom, mostly occurring beyond the conceptions of the Founders and
outside the case law of the Supreme Court. That is, Bruff argues that
what accounts for the actual working relationship between Congress,
the President, and the courts is not to be found in the text of the
Constitution, its structure, the Founders’ original understanding(s)—
and still less in the relatively few landmark separation of powers cases
decided by the Supreme Court—but instead in the ways that they have
worked out shared and exclusive powers over time. As Bruff further
shows, the resulting arrangements have generally reflected a steady
expansion of executive authority for many reasons. Presidents can take
the initiative in ways that collective bodies such as Congress, and
reactive institutions such as the courts, cannot. The nation’s everexpanding foreign policy commitments and national security concerns
tend to favor executive power. The President’s role as the head of a
political party in a system that the Founders never contemplated
enhances executive power still further.
This is a story known to historians, such as Forrest McDonald,6
and political scientists, such as Theodore Lowi, 7 even to historically
inclined political scientists who became President, such as Woodrow
Wilson.8 Yet it is generally absent from legal scholarship. It would have
been an achievement simply had Professor Bruff imported the work
done by political science departments to law schools. He has, however,
done far more. For one thing, he has updated that work. And, with
rigor and imagination, he has made a contribution that would stand on
its own.
Untrodden Ground does this by recounting how various presidents
have actually expanded executive authority in practice. His first claim
is descriptive, namely, that Presidents possess ample power to do great
good or harm to the nation under a formulation of their power that
affords them broad power of initiative yet does not allow them to ignore
statutes. The book’s second major claim moves to the normative. For
Bruff, unilateral presidential assertions of power do not attain
legitimacy unless and until receiving the assent of Congress and the
people.
Untrodden Ground explores both points with a series of case
studies. A case study approach keyed to various presidents is an ideal
way to drive home the central idea that the shape of the modern
presidency lies not with the Constitution but in the assertions various
6.

Forrest McDonald, The American Presidency: An Intellectual
History (1994).

7.

Theodore J. Lowi, Benjamin Ginsberg, Kenneth A. Shepsle &
Stephen Ansolabehere, American Government: Power and Purpose (13th ed., 2013).

8.

Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United
States (1908).
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presidents have made over time. Choosing eleven such studies—not
counting the chapter on the Founding—also seems right. The number
permits the case studies to have depth without being lengthy, in turn
makes the book manageable, and still covers nearly one-fourth of our
Chief Executives. The trick becomes which eleven to pick. Professor
Bruff’s choices are also hard to fault. In the main he has—with one
exception—chosen the strongest presidents, who by definition have
pushed the constitutional limits the furthest. On this basis, Woodrow
Wilson, for his wartime expansion of executive authority and peacetime
failure; Polk, for his own wartime adventurism; and even Van Buren,
for his transformation of presidential selection through true parties, are
all candidates for further inclusion.
Conversely, the choice of Andrew Johnson, the one included failure,
suggests that it might be useful to select a weak president.9 Additional
“mirror image” case studies—that is, consideration of legislative
assertions of power during the age of what Wilson described as
“Congressional government” under “weak” presidents such as Hayes, or
the second Harrison—or for that matter, in their different ways, Gerald
Ford or Jimmy Carter—might provide an interesting, more complicated
angle on the overall story of executive aggrandizement.
To an extent, these great strengths—as well as the possible
selection bias—appear in the individual chapters. On one hand, the
accounts of Washington10 and Jefferson11 show how fast and far these
early presidents departed from initial constitutional expectations to
enhance the office in ways great and small. They also show how the
judiciary either largely or entirely stayed on the sidelines. Each chapter
does so, moreover, with a firm command of the leading scholarship of
the era and with reference to several lesser-known episodes. On the
other hand, the stories told do not go much further than confirming
that such strong Presidents wielded significant power that enhanced
the office even as it sometimes ran into effective congressional or
popular opposition. Once more, it might have been useful to know
whether these episodes illustrated any overall pattern, whether
executive expansion, relative stasis, or cyclical ebb and flow and why.
Untrodden Ground is nonetheless a notable work in several respects.
As noted, it addresses a critical topic that tends to generate more heat
than light. It does so with thoughtfulness and moderation. Not least,
the book also provides an extra-judicial, post-Founding historical
approach that goes beyond most legal scholarship on executive
authority.
Beyond that, Untrodden Ground is innovative, interesting, and
ultimately important. The innovation lies in its use of history as
9.

Harold Bruff, Untrodden Ground, 201–02 (2015).

10.

See id. at 30.

11.

See id. at 3.
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refracted through constitutional law and theory. As noted, there are
several histories of the presidency that necessarily recount the rise of
the executive to its current primacy. Few, however, do so with a focus
on constitutional doctrine, interpretation, and development. What
studies there are, such as by John Yoo12 or Steven Calebresi and
Christopher Yoo,13 are either tendentious or severely one-sided. Interest
in the book, considered a bit more fully, should result from Professor
Bruff’s recapture of important episodes in presidential power grabs,
which are usually compelling in themselves, with an eye to considering
current struggles. The book’s importance, as noted, rests on precisely
the immense power recent presidents have exercised and the even more
extensive claims that they continue to assert.
These assets should ensure that Untrodden Ground reaches the
wide audience it deserves. Professor Bruff himself makes clear that his
intended audience is not just legal academics and students, but
educated and informed citizens who have an interest in the direction of
their government.14 This makes sense on several counts. From a civic
standpoint, rigorous and thoughtful accounts of our evolving constitutional framework need to move beyond law schools and into the
general public, especially since this space appears currently filled by
tendentious polemics. Happily, the volume will do just this. The stories
are dramatic. The personalities are compelling. The writing is vivid.
Perhaps ironically, the only thing that undercuts the book’s ambition
in this regard is its own rigor. The wealth of historical and legal detail,
while necessary, may be daunting to the general lay reader. That said,
Professor Bruff does make the rigor as palatable as possible.
As for the more specialized scholarly audience, Untrodden Ground
should fill a significant gap. As noted, it most closely resembles political
histories of the presidency, such as Forrest McDonald’s The American
Presidency.15 Such works, however, do not grapple with the
constitutional dimension with the same analytic rigor that a law
professor as Bruff would. Conversely, leading accounts by law professors
tend to sacrifice either historical focus or integrity in the service of
various legal prescriptions. Some are truly problematic, such as John

12.

See Yoo, supra note 4.

13.

See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary
Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush (2008).

14.

See Bruff, supra note 9, at 9 (stating that the modern interpretation of
law is a set of practices that have become normatively binding upon the
community. While describing the law as a necessary part of politics, the
book balances law and political power within the normative understanding of each, and its points are therefore both beneficial to scholars
and laypersons.).

15.

See Forrest McDonald, supra note 6.
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Yoo’s Crisis and Command,16 or at least one-sided, for example,
Calebresi and Christopher Yoo’s The Unitary Executive.17 Others are
provocative yet credible, including Ackerman’s Decline and Fall of the
American Republic18 on the “left” and Posner and Vermeule’s The
Executive Unbound19 from the “right.” Few, if any, seek to consider the
evolution of the presidency, by a specialist, with an approach balancing
history and constitutional law as well as with a balanced position on
executive power itself. This would be reason enough to turn to the
volume.
Yet there is at least one reason more. The accounts that Professor
Bruff carefully provides have significant implications for constitutional
interpretation not just with respect to separation of powers, but in
general. In particular, Untrodden Ground undermines standard attempts to cash out specific doctrine based upon text, structure, and,
most of all, original understandings. Text hardly suffices since it is too
often exceedingly vague and contested—the Executive Vesting Clause,
the Appointments Clause—or simply not there—removal, treaty
termination.20 Likewise, structural inference may yield great functional
principles such as balance among the three branches to prevent concentration of power but falls short of providing compelling specifics to
settle whether such devices such as the legislative veto should be
deemed legitimate.21 Most of all, history employed in the wooden
originalism of Justice Scalia proves to be a false god. As Justice Jackson
noted, for most modern separation of powers controversies, the relevant

16.

See John Yoo, supra note 4.

17.

See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 13.

18.

See Ackerman, supra note 1.

19.

See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2.

20.

See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power, Essentialism, and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 546 (2004).

21.

Compare INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (stating that even if a
law is “efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the
hallmarks—of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather
than blunted by the fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing
with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority”), with INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967, 968 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Court’s actions have “sound[ed] the death knell for nearly 200
other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a ‘legislative
veto.’” The veto was the main means of “secur[ing] the accountability of
executive and independent agencies,” and without that veto, Congress is
left to choose between refraining from the delegation of authority and
abdicating its authority to the executive branch and agencies.).
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historical materials are simply too conflicted and contradictory to
provide clear answers with any confidence.22
Untrodden Ground confirms these challenges by showing what has
generally settled border disputes among the branches—constitutional
custom. As Professor Bruff shows over and over, usually the arrangements that stick are those initially undertaken by the President and
ultimately accepted by Congress or the electorate. This is not to say
that custom is itself always easy to discern. Curtis Bradley and Trevor
Morrison recently outlined the various challenges in reading relevant
custom to settle separation of powers questions.23 Professor Bruff’s
careful accounts of key episodes in our over two centuries of
constitutional custom nonetheless make the task immeasurably easier.
Finally, Untrodden Ground raises questions that it cannot fully
resolve as a work of history. First and foremost, has the overall shift in
power toward the executive branch that custom has brought about
done more harm than good? Answering this question in constitutional
terms would at the very least require some way to assess whether the
fundamental commitment to balance is being fulfilled, or if custom has
altered that commitment itself in favor of the type of executive power
required for the nation to prevail in an ever more dangerous world.
Something like this latter position currently appears in the work of
leading conservative scholars such as Posner and Vermeule,24 as well as
Jack Goldsmith.25 One problem with these approaches, however, is that
while custom may be able to fill in even grand gaps and details, such
as removal, claiming that it can alter truly fundamental constitutional
commitments—such as balance—without the affirmative deliberation
of the amendment process, this is a claim of an entirely different order.
It is for this reason that other modern scholars, such as Bruce
Ackerman, view the customary hegemony of the President with
substantial alarm.26 As he and others note, Congress’s collective action
22.

See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–35
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Just what our forefathers did envision,
or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be
divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was
called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan
debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies
more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any
question. They largely cancel each other. And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions
in the narrowest way. Id.

23.

See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Essay: Presidential Power,
Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097,
1127 (2013).

24.

See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2.

25.

Goldsmith, supra note 3.

26.

See Ackerman, supra note 1.
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problems, the creation of the administrative state, the nation’s rise to
superpower status, all suggest that whatever restraining power
Congress may have exercised is in decline. Nor are these phenomena
new. Perhaps nowhere has such alarm been more eloquently expressed
than by Justice Jackson in a passage of his classic Youngstown concurrence that too often gets edited out in the casebooks. The classic opinion
concluded with a dark mixture of despair and resolve:
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except
that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made
by parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may be destined
to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first,
to give them up.27

Untrodden Ground may not strike a similar chord of despair. But
it should serve as a wake-up call. Professor Bruff’s case studies add up
to an enormous net gain for the executive at the expense of the
legislature and the courts. On the assumption that the Madisonian
dedication to balance holds, this enormous shift in power has to raise
grave questions and concerns. And whether first or last, the volume
demonstrates that the courts alone will not be able to stem the tide.
Instead, as Justice Jackson really argued and as Professor Bruff
confirms, the ultimate checks must come from Congress and the people.
Untrodden Ground should help educate all concerned to make informed
and prudent choices.

27.

See Youngstown, 343 U.S at 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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